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Abstract 
Taking its inspiration from the 21st-century protest chant, ‘This is what democracy looks 
like!’, this chapter explores the interrelation between theories of representation and modes 
of radical democracy.   Drawing on Jacques Rancière, Chantal Mouffe, and others, Schmidt 
analyses recent political actions that refuse to adhere to what he calls ‘the politics of the 
count’, including demonstrations against tuition fee increases in the UK, the 2011 London 
riots, the actions of UK Uncut, and Occupy, all of which emerged within the same twelve 
months.  Such actions produce a representational crisis in two interrelated meanings of the 
idea of representation: they challenge representational democracy, but also challenge our 
understandings of what counts as the political—that is to say, what politics looks like. 
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Everyone has their own way in.  For me, the story begins shortly after 9/11 and the 
subsequent bombing campaign in Afghanistan, when I began to become aware that these 
global acts of violence have their sources much closer to home—and, indeed, could even be 
mapped to what was then my own home, the US state of Georgia.  Feeling helpless in the 
face of violence that I could not prevent, and desperate to make a difference where I might 
be able, I travelled with others to the US Army base at Fort Benning, near the border with 
Alabama.  This base, founded in 1918, is home to what is now called the Western 
Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation, but which for many decades went by the 
name of the ‘School of the Americas’: a combat training school for Latin American soldiers, 
implicated in human rights atrocities through its dissemination of counter-insurgency and 
psychological warfare techniques that were subsequently applied against civilian populations 
throughout the ‘dirty wars’ in Argentina, Chile, and elsewhere.  Every November since 1990, 
the activist organisation School of the Americas Watch organises a vigil at the gates of Fort 
Benning, commemorating los desaparecidos (‘the disappeared’) and others lost to state 
violence in the Americas and beyond. 
This is where I was in 2001.1  My memory of this, my first but not last experience as a 
participant in mass demonstration, is a daze of sensation and spectacle: song, imagery, 
dance, chanting, collective gesture.  Larger-than-life puppets and figurines floating above the 
marching demonstrators, and also individual protestors, dressed and masked as skeletal 
apparitions to represent los desaparecidos—figures who would later trespass onto the 
military compound and handcuff themselves to trees and fences.  What is the relevance of 
these symbolic—one might even say theatrical—aspects of the demonstration to the broader 
politics of the event?  Do they add anything, or do they merely acquire importance from their 
proximity to the ‘real’ risks being taken nearby?  In my own memory, the feeling of 
camaraderie and group-belonging figures equally with the vigil’s charged location in its 
significance, and it is indeed this experiential aspect that has characterised the 
‘carnivalesque’ turn of post-Situationist protest: ‘Revolutionary moments are carnivals in 
which the individual life celebrates its unification with a regenerated society,’ as Raoul 
Vaneigem influentially wrote in 1967.2   
Many key studies of social protest movements have focused on these experiential qualities in 
shaping and reshaping participants’ identities;3 but as suits the present collection, I want to 
focus here on its theatrical aspects, the relation between its performance and what the 
performance represents.  As a discipline, performance studies has itself taken inspiration 
from the spontaneous choreography of protest, as in Richard Schechner’s appropriation and 
expansion of the idea of the ‘carnivalesque’ in relation to what he would call ‘public direct 
theatre’.4  He argued that the symbolism of protest is not secondary to its politics, but bound 
up in them; but even as he does so, he retains a separation between the ‘actual’ and the 
‘representational’: ‘The direct theatre is not “about” something so much as it is made “of” 
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something,’ Schechner writes.  ‘It is actual + symbolic rather than referential/
representational’.5  Schechner further acknowledged an implicit distinction between these 
symbolic gestures and the ‘real’ of politics: ‘When armed troops arrive, the intense whorling 
of direct theatre stops’.6  More recently, Sophie Nield has described such a similar division 
between the ‘real’ on one side and the ‘symbolic’ or ‘theatrical’ on the other, where ‘[t]he 
term “theatrical” itself almost becomes a marker for artificiality.’7 But unlike Schechner, Nield 
argues against this distinction, not merely in relation to the ways in which political events 
obviously have a dramaturgical dimension (as Schechner had suggested with his term ‘direct 
theatre’); but in a more fundamental way, in which we might use the idea of the ‘theatrical’ 
to describe the capacity of certain kinds of spaces to enable or disable the production of 
appearances8—as, for example, the appearance of ‘the people’, the demos who are manifest 
at the demonstration.9 
These distinctions bring to mind one of my strongest memories of the 2001 vigil.  As night-
time began to close in, there was a shift in the dynamics of the demonstration.  I remember, 
as I lingered near the fortified gates of the military base, an angry, energised group of 
protestors (whom in subsequent demonstrations I would learn to recognise as black bloc 
anarchists). They were swirling and dancing around a bonfire of placards and driftwood: 
drumming, shouting, exuberant, and terrifying, breaking up more and more combustable 
materials and adding them to the fire.  Again and again they repeated their chant: ‘This is 
what democracy looks like.  This is what democracy looks like.  This is what democracy looks 
like.’  This phrase has haunted me, and indeed has proliferated as a frequent refrain at many 
demonstrations in the 21st century.  It rose to popularity with the 1999 alter-globalisation 
protests in Seattle—not least as the title given to the crowd-sourced documentary that 
further popularised those events;10 and it persists as a rallying cry for current movements 
such as Occupy Democracy in the UK Parliament Square in 2015.11  What might be made of 
this phrase?  On the one hand it is a characteristically performative act of self-manifestation, 
insisting on its own coming-into-being through the simultaneous act of self-naming.  But, in 
this instance, it is also what might be called a negative-performative, as it accompanies an act 
of negation and refusal: what you call democracy is not democracy, it implies; instead, 
democracy is this: dissent, antagonism, multiplicity, anarchy.  But how does one represent a 
negation, the ‘an-’ of anarchism?  Can a radical, dissensual democracy only be expressed in 
the negative, or might it find a positive, durable form?  And what, finally, might it mean to 
look like democracy?  Is representation antithetical to radical politics?  These questions 
remained with me in the years to come, and came to the forefront again, many years later, in 
the series of protests that occupied the streets of my later home, London.  It is these 
questions to which I return here. 
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The politics of the count 
For many theorists of radical democracy, the challenge for politics today is the task of making 
the political appear.  Chantal Mouffe  articulates this in terms of a distinction between 
politics and what she calls ‘the political’, the relations of power and antagonisms that are 
always present, however much a liberal consensus would seek to transcend them.12  But such 
an occlusion in the name of a rational consensus is premised on a different consensus, one 
that goes unstated, regarding what does and does not constitute politics.  As a result, before 
any political discourse can be heard or made visible, there is the prior matter of the exclusion 
of that which is not recognised as politics.  For this reason, Mouffe argues, ‘Instead of trying 
to erase the traces of power and exclusion, democratic politics requires us to bring them to 
the fore, to make them visible so that they can enter the terrain of contestation.’13 
This interrelation between radical politics and the task of making-visible recalls Hannah 
Arendt’s idea of ‘spaces of appearance’, in which the category of the political is not restricted 
to certain places or domains where politics ‘properly’ belongs, but defined by action:  
The space of appearance comes into being wherever men [and women] are 
together in the manner of speech and action, and therefore predates and 
precedes all formal constitution of the public realm and the various forms of 
government, that is, the various forms in which the public realm can be 
organized.14 
Revisiting Arendt’s concept in the light of the so-called ‘movement of the squares’, Judith 
Butler finds it useful for its expansion of our understanding of the political beyond the spaces 
and procedures designated for ‘politics’ per se.  However, Butler also points out that even in 
Arendt’s idealisation, ‘such a view disregards and devalues those forms of political agency 
that emerge precisely in those domains deemed prepolitical or extrapolitical and that break 
into the sphere of appearance as from the outside, as its outside, confounding the distinction 
between inside and outside.’15  That is to say, if in order to have rights one must appear in 
the political sphere, even in an expanded sense of the political as Arendt defines it, then 
there is a prior matter of the right to appear.  As Butler writes, ‘any conception of the political 
has to take into account what operation of power demarcates the political from the 
prepolitical.’16 
Jacques Rancière defines this problem as one of ‘dissensus’: more than mere disagreement 
about a political claim (who has wronged whom, for example), dissensus describes a failure 
to recognise a claim as political, or even as a claim at all—that is, it is a disagreement about 
what constitutes a wrong and who is a person capable of being wronged, as opposed to 
being merely injured.  Dissensus is an interruption into what he describes as ‘the distribution 
of the sensible’, the apportioning of proper roles and modes of expression.  For Rancière, 
‘Politics, before all else, is an intervention in the visible and the sayable,’17 and in this way it is 
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intertwined with aesthetics, the name for our capacity to recognise sounds, images, and 
gestures as meaningful—even to recognise them as human.  To put it another way, and to 
return to the terms of the anarchist chant, democracy might be understood first and 
foremost as a matter of looking like democracy: a radical demand that insists on a change in 
how one looks and hears in order that an act is recognised as political in the first place.   
We might understand dissensus as posing a challenge to ideas of political representation with 
regard to two interrelated meanings of the idea of representation.  Firstly, it is a challenge to 
representational democracy, by which the views of all are meant to be incorporated within 
the regime of politics; however, in any allocation of roles there is always what Rancière calls 
‘the part of those who have no part’: those who have no allocated part and nothing to offer 
(wealth, experience, nobility, virtue) except their own claim to equality.18  Dissensus 
challenges the consensual agreement around what should count as politics, and how it 
should be counted; as articulated by cultural activists BAVO, it occurs when someone or 
some group ‘steps outside of line’ and ‘makes a claim that s/he is unauthorized or unqualified 
to do.’19  Rancière describes dissensus as exposing ‘a fundamental miscount’;20 and the 
correction to this miscount is not merely a matter of inclusion into the count—giving 
representation to those who are not represented—but a more radical challenge to any 
regime of counting, which will always be insufficient. In this way, it becomes a challenge to 
representation in a second sense, one that might be understood as a theatrical sense, and 
that has to do with the signification assigned to a particular action or gesture and its 
recognition (or exclusion) from the category of ‘the political’.  Indeed, in describing this 
dynamic, Rancière invokes the metaphor of the theatre by describing politics as a kind of 
stage of visiblity: ‘Politics consists in reconfiguring the partition of the sensible, in bringing on 
stage new objects and subjects, in making visible that which was not visible, audible as 
speaking beings they who were merely heard as noisy animals’.21   
These two senses of representational crisis can be seen in operation in the responses to the 
2010 protests in the UK over proposed rises in student tuition fees and cuts to further 
education.  These changes, including tripling of university tuition fees, were ultimately 
implemented by the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government on 9 December 
2010, in contravention of the pre-election campaign promises of the Liberal Democrat party 
to oppose any rise in tuition fees.  In advance of the parliamentary vote on the issue, a 
number of demonstrations were called, primarily in London.  The first of these 
demonstrations, on 10 November, was jointly organised by traditional forms of 
representative power, the National Union of Students (NUS) and the University and Colleges 
Union (UCU, representing further- and higher-education workers).  The planned 
demonstration followed the standard format of organised protest, including a fixed route of 
travel agreed in advance with the police services, culminating in a rally at the end of the 
demonstration route in which the assembled crowd would be addressed by pre-determined 
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speakers selected for their representative function (e.g., the presidents and general 
secretaries of the major unions involved, as well as other elected officials). 
However, alongside the official demonstration, a smaller group of protestors broke off from 
the agreed route and forced their way into the Conservative Party headquarters in Millbank 
Tower, smashing windows and occupying the building.  Much of the commentary on this 
breakaway group focused on one protestor who threw a fire extinguisher from the roof of 
the building, and the organisers of the processual march were quick to distance themselves 
from these events.  UCU General Secretary Sally Hunt issued a short press release, which 
declared: 
The actions of a mindless and totally unrepresentative minority should not distract 
from today’s message. The overwhelming majority of staff and students on the 
march came here to send a clear and peaceful message to the politicians.22 
Even in such a compact statement, it is notable how Hunt’s comments conflate the march’s 
message with its form of delivery: its ‘peaceful’ quality is synonymous with the unity and 
singularity of the organised procession, and to deviate from the form is also to depart from 
the message.  A similar logic is evident in NUS President Aaron Porter’s condemnation, 
delivered via Twitter: ‘Disgusted that the actions of a minority of idiots are trying to 
undermine 50,000 who came to make a peaceful protest’.23  In this way, the organisers of the 
larger demonstration sought to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate forms of 
protest, with the violence of the latter being regrettable not only in its own right, but also 
because it marred the image of protest they had worked to achieve.   
Even in such a short format—although certainly knowing that the tweet will be circulated—
Porter’s tweet conspicuously emphasises the tally of the number of protestors, and makes a 
contrast between that number and the ‘minority of idiots’ (similar to Hunt’s ‘mindless and 
totally unrepresentative minority’).  Such an emphasis on numbers has become a recurrent 
feature of contemporary demonstrations; indeed, one might say that the number itself is the 
message.  This tendency is epitomised by what has become remembered as the largest anti-
war rally in history, the worldwide protests on 15 February 2003 against the pending invasion 
of Iraq.  But the achievement of such a scale of mobilisation is necessarily dependent upon 
organisation and coherence, such that there is inevitably something curiously normative 
about such an event.  As Jenny Hughes notes, what was being protested in 2003 was not so 
much war itself as the absence of United Nations sanction: ‘The demonstration affirmed the 
normative—it sought the maintenance of a fiction of normality and law to fix the world at a 
time of crisis.’24  So, in the end, it is perhaps not surprising that the eruptions of violence 
alongside the 2010 student protests were criticised not only by the decision-makers who 
were the target of the demonstration, but also by the union organisers themselves.  To recall 
the phrasing used by BAVO, those activists who ‘stepped outside the line’ not only deviated 
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from the agreed route of the demonstration, but also challenged the logic of the line itself.  
This is an illustration of what we might call the politics of the count, where what is at stake is 
exactly the ‘count’ in its double-sense: the various versions of the official tally of the day, but 
also the question of what counts as politics.   
 
‘Criminality, pure and simple’ 
The remainder of 2010, leading up to the Parliamentary vote on 9 December, saw increasing 
challenges to the politics of the count.  These included large-scale protests in London on 24 
November, 30 November, and 9 December itself, as well as other protests and sit-ins 
throughout the UK.  During this period, police services introduced the controversial 
technique of ‘kettling’, constructing temporary fences to contain protesters out-of-doors for 
extended periods of time, sometimes overnight.  As a consequence, the London protests 
were increasingly characterised by cat-and-mouse counter-tactics, with smaller groups of 
protestors taking varied routes throughout the city, often running and manoeuvring in small 
teams, making noise and commotion, and causing disruption to the ordinary flow of the city.  
After the 9 December vote confirmed the tuition increases, the protests gave way to 
significant violence and destruction of property, particularly within Parliament Square where 
thousands were kettled.  Other actions coalesced around the Cenotaph for the First World 
War on Whitehall and targeted a car containing a hapless Prince Charles and the Duchess of 
Cornwall as they tried to attend a West End theatre (‘First time for everything,’ joked the 
duchess about being caught up in the protest)25. 
 Many media and government responses to these actions emphasised a distinction between 
legitimate protest and acts of violence.  Following the events that included the attack on the 
royal family, UK Home Secretary Theresa May declared, ‘What we are seeing in London 
tonight, the wanton vandalism, smashing of windows, has nothing to do with peaceful 
protest […].  Attacks on police officers and property show that some of the protesters have 
no respect for London or its citizens’.26  May makes a distinction between the protesters and 
‘citizens’, as if the protesters are no longer citizens, but her statement nevertheless appears 
to concede the legitimacy of the category of ‘protester’.  A productive contrast can be made 
between these acts of protest, property destruction, and urban intervention in November 
and December 2010 and the riots that would engulf London and other major UK cities just six 
months later.  Following the fatal shooting of black Londoner Mark Duggan by police officers 
on 4 August 2011, an initially peaceful demonstration escalated into national unrest over 
several days, including widespread violence, looting of shops, and several large-scale fires.  As 
Katie Pollard and Maria Young point out, there were many similarities between the scenes 
from the previous winter and those in August: 
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The form of these protests in many ways anticipated the riots the following 
August: they refused to follow planned routes or to stay as one mass; property 
was destroyed; people fought off the police; and there was a feeling of criminality 
and of taking the streets. At moments the violence superseded demand making.27  
However, they note, ‘unlike the riots, all this [student protest] took place in central London, 
and so the protests’ targets of destruction were largely symbols of power and state 
authority—the Conservative party headquarters, the Treasury, the Cenotaph and Prince 
Charles.’  Lacking such ‘legitimate’ (if frowned-upon) targets, the August riots were instead 
condemned by UK Prime Minister David Cameron as theft, not politics: ‘Young people 
stealing flat-screen televisions and burning shops—that was not about politics or protest, it 
was about theft.’28  In a prepared speech a few days after the riots were quelled, Cameron 
again signalled that the criteria that distinguished legitimate protest was the choice of target 
for destructive action:  ‘These riots were not about government cuts: they were directed at 
high street stores, not Parliament.’29  In need of a term other than ‘protest’ to describe these 
actions, Cameron declared, ‘It is criminality, pure and simple—and there is absolutely no 
excuse for it.’30 
The abstraction ‘criminality’ would become a signifier of choice for both politicians and 
media, locating the source of the unrest not in specific circumstances but in more generalised 
moral faults.31  For both left and right, the actors in the unrest tended to be described as 
products of their social circumstances.  The view from the right saw the underlying causes to 
be moral deficiencies endemic to particular circumstances, as typified in Cameron’s speech 
on 15 August 2011, which catalogued the Conservative view of the causes: 
Irresponsibility.  Selfishness.  Behaving as if your choices have no consequences. 
Children without fathers.  Schools without discipline.  Reward without effort. 
Crime without punishment.  Rights without responsibilities.  Communities without 
control.32 
Cameron’s diagnosis calls for more rigorous ‘policing’ on a cultural scale, including re-
instatement of father figures, discipline in schools, a state-led re-alignment of reward and 
punishment; but also literal policing in terms of criminological structures targeting specific 
populations.  One way in which this approach was immediately manifested was in the 
criminal sentencing for those who were successfully prosecuted for their role in the acts 
committed during the August riots; on average, their sentences were found to be 25% longer 
than normal.33  For the oppositional left, on the other hand, the underlying sources tended to 
be sociological rather than individual, with cuts in social services and infrastructure identified 
as the primary causes.  Former London mayor Ken Livingstone argued, ‘If you’re making 
massive cuts, there’s always the potential for this sort of revolt against that,’ and Alistair 
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Campbell, communications director under the previous Labour government, commented, 
‘People still feel angry about the banks. […] They feel the crisis is not their fault but they were 
the ones who were hit the hardest’.34  
Despite their differences, both sides of this polarisation shared a tendency to reduce the 
rioters themselves to the role of mindless reactionaries, their actions determined either by 
their ‘underclass’ mentality (according to the right) or their structural exclusion (according to 
the left).  As Pollard and Young argue, such a view denies the rioters any agency of their own; 
and in their view, this denial is even more pronounced in the case of the leftist argument: 
The Left made an effort to identify the riots’ external ‘causes’—the closing down 
of youth centres, the end of EMA [the Education Maintenance Allowance], the 
aggression of the police, incessant advertising, and unemployment. They 
suggested that these causes could be ended if bankers were less greedy and 
politicians changed their policies. The only people who were responsible for the 
riots, then, were the politicians and the bankers who should put the system back 
in order. Not only is the Left wrong that the politicians and the bankers have the 
power and ability to do this, but they are wrong that the rioters have no agency or 
power.35 
Instead, Pollard and Young argue for a third view, one that appropriates Cameron’s phrase, 
but in order to embrace criminality as a political act in its own right: ‘The riots were not crime 
as a means to a message, being violent to get heard, but were criminality for criminality’s 
sake—criminality pure and simple.’  As they put it, the riots were ‘[n]ot breaking the law to 
make demands of the state, but breaking the law to break the law’.36  Similarly, Slavoj Žižek 
rejects both the de-humanising rhetoric of the right and the social determinist logic of the 
left; for Žižek, the violence during the riots is not a mis-directed symptom of a society’s 
failings but instead the violent articulation of that very society: it is ‘a moment of genuine 
protest, in the form of an ironic response to consumerist ideology: “You call on us to 
consume while simultaneously depriving us of the means to do it properly—so here we are 
doing it the only way we can!”’37 
 In my accounts of both the (predominantly) student protests in the winter and the riots the 
following summer, I have emphasised the way in which the presence or absence of certain 
elements to the actions—a clear message, identifiable leaders, specific targets, the 
destruction of property—were used as the basis for arguments about whether certain 
actions are political or not.  These eruptions of dissensus in London’s streets, then, exemplify 
the dynamic described by Mouffe and Rancière in which the designation of something as 
fitting the category of politics is itself the domain of the political—the distribution by which 
some actions are understood as representing grievances, and others are simply meaningless 
noise (‘criminality, pure and simple’ in Cameron’s memorable phrase).  In revisiting these 
events, my intention is not to make a claim that one or the other set of criteria is correct: 
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that the student protests were political and the riots were not, for example, or the other way 
around.  Instead my intention is to underscore the way in which what we say about such 
actions, how we understand and interpret them, is itself where ‘politics’ happens.  That is, 
these actions are dissensual not because they are ways of representing challenges to existing 
political ideas, but because they challenge the idea of what is and isn’t political 
representation.  They provoke us to think, listen, and see differently with regard to the 
function of urban spaces, the expectation of who belongs here, and the propriety and 
impropriety of certain actions. 
 
Facilitating dissensus 
In different ways, the student protests and the August riots manifest dissensus as negation or 
disruption, as violent rends in the fabric of the political.  But is this necessarily the case?  
Must dissensus always be realised as refusal, as ‘stepping out of line’, or can it also be a 
matter of generating new forms of co-appearance?  One way into thinking about this 
question might be seen in actions organised at the chronological midpoint between the two 
events described so far.  On 26 March 2011, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) organised a 
‘March for the Alternative’ in central London, situated as a broad protest against the planned 
‘austerity’ cuts from the coalition government—cuts that would primarily affect social 
services, welfare, health, and education.  As with the 10 November march described above, 
the central structure of the demonstration was a planned procession through the city, 
culminating in a rally at Hyde Park, where representatives of various constituencies 
(beginning with the TUC general secretary and followed by the head of the Labour Party) 
would address the crowd.  Again, the politics of the count was in evidence, and the 
cumulative number of protestors was presented as the headline message of the day: the BBC 
estimated 250,000 protestors while the Guardian newspaper estimated 400,000, and both 
noted that it was the largest protest since the February 2003 march against the invasion of 
Iraq.38  Again, there was an explicit link between the form of the demonstration and its 
message: ‘We are here to send a message to the government that we are strong and united,’ 
said the TUC general secretary.39 
Alongside the official demonstration, however, there were also breakaway groups that left 
the planned itinerary and instead took action in other parts of central London, most notably 
the main shopping area of Oxford Street.  Several of these breakaway actions were organised 
by UK Uncut, a group that had begun to form over social networking in the autumn of the 
previous year, and which set out to use direct action to specifically target banks, businesses, 
and international subsidiaries that were alleged to have avoided their full tax responsibilities 
in the UK.  UK Uncut’s tactics range from traditional forms of direct action, such as sit-ins and 
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blockades that force branches to close, to more creative forms of occupation that turn their 
targets into utopian mirror-images of themselves that deliver the public services that are 
under threat from austerity cuts.  These have included using theatrical props and costumes 
to turn Starbucks coffee franchises into libraries, and crèches and bank branches into forests 
and hospitals.40 
During the 26 March 2011 demonstration, UK Uncut coordinated the creative occupation of 
elite department store Fortnum & Mason, owned by a conglomerate alleged to have evaded 
over £40 million in tax.41  Around 400 protestors disrupted commerce by placing banners 
over the store shelves, convening a tea party with their own picnic baskets (in contrast to the 
luxury hampers for sale in the store), and organising themselves by consensus-based 
decision-making.42  The store was eventually surrounded by police, and video footage from 
the day shows protestors being told by police they could leave peacefully; however, they 
were instead kettled and many arrested on their way out of the store.43  Despite the protest 
having been described as ‘non-violent’ and ‘sensible’ by the police officers at the scene, 
hundreds were held overnight, and many protestors were later convicted of aggravated 
trespass.  Evoking the distinction between protest and ‘criminality’, the chief prosecutor in 
these trials declared, ‘These protesters chose to disrupt a legitimate business, which is not 
peaceful protest and is a criminal offence’.44  Elsewhere in the area, numerous other shops 
and banks had windows smashed or were attacked with paint in actions not affiliated with UK 
Uncut, and some accounts claim that the harsh treatment of the non-violent protest at 
Fortnum’s was coloured by these events, part of a deliberate police policy to ‘draw “a line in 
the sand” between peaceful protest and criminal trespass’.45 
As with the student protests before it and the riots after, then, a contest over what does and 
does not constitute legitimate political expression was foregrounded in the response to this 
action.  On BBC’s Newsnight programme a few days after the TUC march, host Emily Maitlis 
attempts to enforce such a distinction in an interview with a UK Uncut organiser identified as 
Lucy Annson.46  As I will argue, this interview becomes not only the site for the 
representation of different political views, but a contest over the terms of representation 
itself.  Maitlis begins her interview with the characteristically blunt, impatient style for which 
Newsnight is known, and throughout the interview rarely allows Annson to finish her 
sentences: ‘Just talk us through your position on the kind of violence at Saturday’s march.  It’s 
noticeable that you haven’t condemned it.  Do you?’  Annson’s reply attempts to refuse the 
role she is being asked to play: 
We’re a group of people who self-organise.  We don’t have a position on things.  
What we do is share resources to be able to plan actions against the cuts, and it’s 
very much about empowering the individual to go out there and take civil 
disobedience. 
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Not satisfied with this response, Maitlis keeps pressing the point 
Maitlis: Okay, when the individual’s empowered, does he attack buildings?  Does 
he think it’s wrong if other people attack buildings?  That’s what I’m asking. 
Annson: You might have to ask that particular individual. I mean, certainly… 
Maitlis: … Well what do you think?  You’re a spokesperson for UK Uncut—what do 
you think? 
Annson: Well, I’m a spokesperson for myself.  I’ve never been involved in an action 
where there’s been any property damage.  I like creativity.  I like using art as my 
form of protest, which is why… 
Maitlis: … Is a smashed window creative? Is it art?  I mean, do you think that’s a 
good way of…? 
Annson: … My interpretation is that, no, I wouldn’t choose to smash a window.  
But that’s actually my decision….  In terms of UK Uncut, we create alternative 
spaces.  We have spaces inside banks where we’ve turned them into libraries, into 
forests, into crèches.  We have children and pensioners attending our actions…. 
What is at stake in this insistence on the part of the media performer that distinctions be 
drawn between destruction, politics, and creative activity?  And why does Annson refuse to 
make a distinction?  Crucially, the activist makes it clear that her refusal is not about whether 
or not a distinction can be made (for her, it seems that one can), but instead a refusal to be 
the one to make the distinction on her part to make that distinction for others.  It is a 
recognition that distinguishing is a political act.  Here the dual aspects of representation 
discussed earlier are made manifest: in order to say what an action or gesture means, one 
must first claim the capacity to do so on behalf of another. 
Annson actively refuses both roles, to the frustration of her interrogator, who keeps pressing 
the point: ‘Don’t you think your children and your pensioners and the unions that support 
you would quite like to hear you condemn the violence?  It can’t be that hard, can it?’  
Annson responds by describing the compulsion to ‘condemn or condone, condemn or 
condone’ as an ‘over-simplification’, likening it to a ‘pantomime auditorium’, but Maitlis 
interrupts: 
Maitlis: No, if someone’s throwing things at an officer, if someone is throwing 
things at people in the crowd, if somebody is smashing a bank’s window or a 
shop’s window or whatever…. Is that a good thing or isn’t it?  It’s not a pantomime 
question I’m asking you.  Is it a bad thing to do? 
Annson: It is a simplification of what happens in a demonstration.  A 
demonstration is a space where many things are in flux.  There are many people 
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with different opinions and different tactics.  UK Uncut provides spaces which are 
creative and fun and inclusive…. 
Maitlis … Okay, so if people infer from what you’re saying that you’re not an 
entirely peaceful organisation, that would be pretty fair right? 
Annson: I don’t think that would be fair to say.  I don’t think anyone’s in a position 
to make an assessment other than the people involved in the actions themselves. 
Maitlis: You don’t want to condemn the violence? 
Annson: I don’t think that’s a fair question to ask and I’m going to reject the 
premises of that question. 
The invitation being made to Annson is to claim legitimacy within a particular understanding 
of politics.  Through her willingness to appear on TV, to appear distinct from the crowd, she 
has been extended the right to appear as if she is a political representative.  It is an invitation 
to claim a particular kind of voice: the voice that speaks for others.  But this is not the kind of 
politics which is at stake, the activist keeps insisting.  She is not here to use the actions of 
others to lend potency to her own act of speaking, but instead attempts to use her speech to 
testify to actions that happen elsewhere.  The politics of which she speaks cannot be reduced 
to speech.  You have to be there, she keeps saying.  You have to try it yourself.  As 
sympathetic commentator Niki Seth-Smith notes, ‘It’s not that [the UK Uncut organisers] 
have not taken a position on the violence on behalf of UKUncut; they have recognized that 
they cannot speak for the network.’47 
For Maitlis, this is frustrating, and she fails (or theatrically performs her failure) to recognise 
this kind of politics that deviates from the politics of the count.  ‘What I’m trying to work out 
is why is it more empowering than just joining a solid march of 250,000 people who are all 
pretty much saying the same thing.’  Annson replies, ‘Well, I think that’s actually incorrect.’ 
 
People aren’t always saying the same thing in a march of people.  I did join the 
march.  We had a block on the march, and UK Uncut were really proud to be part 
of the Trade Union march on the Saturday.  It was absolutely fantastic to march 
together.  And we moved away rather than going to the rally... 
Maitlis: Were you on the march? 
Annson: Yeah, that’s right.  And we moved away rather than go to the rally in 
Hyde Park.  We went off into Oxford Street to hold these creative occupations 
where we turned a Boots [a chain pharmacy] into an NHS [National Health Service] 
hospital to campaign against the cuts, we had a comedy venue in Soho Square… 
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Maitlis: [cutting her off] Alright.   
Maitlis is unwilling or incapable of recognising politics in the organising activities that are 
most vital and important to Annson, and cuts her off every time Annson tries to elaborate on 
these.  Where recognition functions as both seeing and allowing to be seen, Maitlis can only 
recognise either the law of the count—manifested in a demonstration of numbers, a form of 
representation that is extra-parliamentary but which follows the same parliamentary logic—
or else violence, destruction, criminality.  This also means that she cannot see the extent to 
which politics happens elsewhere from its proper time and place; including the fact that 
politics is happening there, in that television studio, where a disagreement takes place not 
only over what certain actions might mean but whether it is even permissible to speak of 
them. 
 
The art of the ‘we’ 
Such a refusal to see would not be possible for much longer.  Later that same year, in 
September 2011, the movement called Occupy was born in New York; and a month later, two 
occupations began in London: a larger encampment in the churchyard of St Paul’s, which 
lasted until February 2012, and a smaller site in Finsbury Square, which was cleared in June 
2012.  At the time of this writing in 2015, Parliament Square has also been the site of periodic 
rather than permanent occupations undertaken in the name of Occupy Democracy.48  These 
movements popularised the performative declaration, ‘We are the 99%’, which presents an 
explicit challenge to the politics of the count, articulating exactly the frustration of being 
uncounted by existing political and economic hierarchies.  Moreover, Occupy also departs 
from the logic of the count because it is not a petition; the strategies of encampment, 
organisation, and longevity are undertaken as goals in their own right, rather than oriented 
toward a particular outcome that will come later as the result of the actions of a different 
representative body.  Instead, they are ‘pre-figurative’, ‘creating a vision of the sort of society 
you want to have in miniature,’ as David Graeber, one of the more outspoken of the original 
architects of the movement, articulated in its early, optimistic days.49   
As a challenge to the politics of the count, the first few months of the movement were 
characterised by the same kind of unwillingness or refusal to ‘see’ on the part of mainstream 
media and commentators that was in play in the Newsnight feature on UK Uncut.  Marco 
Deseriis and Jodi Dean describe such commentators as being ‘nearly hysterical in their 
demand for demands: somebody has got to say what Occupy Wall Street wants!’50  For Judith 
Butler, this demand for demands is also a demand to conform to a given idea of what the 
political must look like: according to the mainstream view, she writes, ‘political movements, if 
they are to qualify as “political”, must (a) be organized around a concrete and discrete list of 
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demands, and (b) endeavor to have those demands satisfied.’51  For Butler, Occupy’s 
rejection of each of these criteria is key to its political relevance.  In relation to the first 
criteria—‘Demands should take the form of a list’—Butler argues that no matter how long or 
detailed it is, such an enumeration would always be incomplete; this is because the problem 
is not any (or all) of the individual items on such a list, but instead the systemic causes of 
inequity that connect them.52  With regard to the second criteria, Butler notes that the 
insistence by the mainstream on demands being ‘possible’ reflects the way that ‘the field of 
the political has been constituted such that satisfiable demands become the hallmark of its 
intelligibility’.53  These ‘pre-political’ matters of legibility and intelligibility, and the regulation 
of what kinds of demands are recognised as belonging to the political, return us to the notion 
of dissensus as the refusal and reconfiguration of such frameworks, and the invention of new 
ones.  Rather than a list, Occupy presents an assembly.  Rather than the intelligible, a 
multiplicity of voices. 
Perhaps fittingly, such a reconfiguration finds an exemplary moment in Butler’s own 
appearance at Occupy Wall Street, during which she both describes the performativity of the 
assembly and relies upon the very performative dimensions that she describes.  Like all public 
addresses at Occupy, Butler makes use of the human microphone, by which amplification is 
achieved without electronic infrastructure through the repetition of the speaker’s words in 
unison by those near enough to hear directly.  In her address, she echoes the critique, ‘So 
what are the demands all these people are making?’  If the demands for radical systemic 
change and social justice are demmed ‘impossible’, Butler offers the refrain: ‘Very well, we 
demand the impossible.’  The formal properties of the event mean that her reply, and the 
‘we’ that she articulates, are given voice by those gathered near her—a self-reflective 
performance that she emphasises in her closing rhetoric: 
But it is true  
But it is true   
that there are no demands you can submit to arbitration here  
that there are no demands you can submit to arbitration here 
because we’re not just demanding economic justice  
because we’re not just demanding economic justice  
and social equality. 
and social equality.  
We are assembling in public, 
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We are assembling in public, 
we are coming together as bodies in alliance, 
we are coming together as bodies in alliance, 
in the street and in the square. 
in the street and in the square. 
We are standing here together making democracy, 
We are standing here together making democracy, 
Enacting the phrase, 
Enacting the phrase, 
‘We the people.’ 
We the people.54  
Elsewhere, Butler emphasises the importance of the way that this demand for radical 
equality ‘is not directed to those institutions that reproduce inequality’, but instead to ‘the 
people themselves’: ‘The appeal is to ourselves, and it is this new “we” that is formed, 
episodically and globally, in every action and demonstration.’55  This ‘we’ is fabricated in its 
act of articulation, to borrow Jacques Derrida’s language: the performative self-authorising of 
a ‘we’ articulated ‘in the name of the people’ in the US Declaration of Independence, Derrida 
writes, has a ‘fabulous retroactivity’.56  Butler’s own performance at Occupy Wall Street 
might be understood as an instance of this ‘we’, in which its symbolic and rhetorical 
dimensions are thoroughly interdependent upon its practical necessities.  
Perhaps it is something like this kind of intertwining that Jean-Luc Nancy had in mind in a 
recent lecture in which he argued: ‘What we ask of politics is that it give form and visibility to 
the possibility of living together’.57  He continued: 
Politics—the artistry of the polis, the technique, the know-how, the sleight of 
hand—comes about when the ‘together’—our together and, more precisely, we 
ourselves, must be made possible from the outset.  Politics is the possibilising of a 
we, a we that could then not be possible, that itself lacks evidence and 
givenness.58  
These new forms of appearance—the creative occupations of UK Uncut, the encampments of 
Occupy, the human microphone, the widespread use of formal consensus procedures—
might be understood as positive attempts to address the ‘lack’ of givenness that Nancy 
identifies.  They are like models or theatrical stagings, both metaphorical and practical, and 
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their importance is as much about manifesting an image of a ‘we’ as they are an 
implementation of that collective force toward a stated purpose.  This idea is encapsulated in 
David Graeber’s declaration, in the aftermath of the 1999 Seattle protests: ‘It is not lacking in 
ideology. Those new forms of organization are its ideology.’59 
But has this focus on the fabrication of forms of community been taken too far?  Many critics 
on the left have warned of the danger of fetishizing these forms of organization at the cost of 
losing any commitment to action.  Often this criticism is manifested as frustration with 
endless discussion—which is problematic not only in its own right, but also because such 
discussion is often predicated upon unquestioned patterns of privilege and exclusivity.  
Andrew Cornell gives a scathing account of one such experience in the context of 2004 
protests taking place against the backdrop of the US Republican party National Convention 
(RNC): 
Eventually my affinity group and I formulated the theory that many people at 
those meetings weren’t all that concerned about how successful the actions 
would be at disrupting the RNC or how they might be strategically useful in 
creating real policy change. Why? Because the real revolution was happening right 
there, on the dirty floor of a warehouse in Red Hook, Brooklyn, where 75 people, 
nine tenths of them white and economically comfortable, were having 
‘democratic’ conversations. The revolution was the process itself—assuming that 
every nuance of consensus procedure was followed, the facilitator ran through 
the ‘stack’ in the correct order, and each participant used the correct hand 
gesture to indicate that she wanted to make a ‘direct response.’ It didn’t matter 
what the outcome was, as long as we were ‘reinventing democracy’ in the 
process.60  
If these new forms of organisation are the movement’s ideology, as Graeber asserted, then 
for Cornell, the ideology in this instance is not only ineffective but also exclusionary.  Cornell’s 
critique is typical in its assessment of the way in which new social movements might find 
themselves bogged down in procedural detail, in the minutiae of the mechanisms of 
representation.  More pernicious is the way that exclusions are reinstated: even as these new 
forms attempt to counter the hierarchies of received forms of representation, the 
‘democracy’ they create frequently remains open only to those who have economic and 
social privilege.  
 
For a representational pluralism 
I would suggest that one way to think through this problem of the fetishizing of form is to 
consider it in terms of contrasting views on representation.  As Jodi Dean and Jason Jones  
summarize, some advocates of these social movements describe their practices as anti- or 
17 
 
  
post-representation, characterised by non-hierarchical horizontality, individual self-
determination, and self-authorization;61 these attributes are frequently cited by advocates of 
‘direct democracy’ or a ‘leaderless revolution’.62  Indeed, in Michael Hardt and Antonio 
Negri’s Declaration, in which they attempt to articulate the energy and ideology of Occupy 
and other popular movements of 2011, ‘representation’ recurs as an obstacle to democracy: 
‘representation is in itself, by definition, a mechanism that separates the population from 
power, the commanded from those who command,’63 they write; it ‘blocks democracy rather 
than fosters it’.64    
However, Dean and Jones argue that these new forms of activism are not opposed to 
representational structures, but instead realise the tensions and antagonisms of 
representation itself.  In relation to Occupy, for example, this antagonism is manifest in the 
act of naming— ‘We are the 99 percent’—rather than the action itself.  It is not that urban 
camping is inherently politicised, they argue, for it is easy to think of non-politicised 
examples.  Rather, the occupation is political because it is made in the name of the 99 
percent—that is, it is represents the 99 percent.  And in making this representational gesture, 
it calls the 99 percent into being.  ‘Far from being post-representation,’ they write, ‘the 
movement divisively asserts, repeatedly and with determination, the fundamental economic 
antagonism at the heart of capitalism’.65   We can find a similar sentiment argued by Chantal 
Mouffe in her reflection on the social movements of the 2000s, in which she supports the 
claim that ‘far from contradicting democracy, representation is one of its very conditions’.66  
Mouffe and Dean are in close agreement on this point: ‘A pluralist democratic society cannot 
exist without representation,’ argues Mouffe,67 and Dean makes the similar assertion, ‘Ever-
changing plurality is the condition of representation, not its overcoming.’68   
As described at the beginning of this chapter, one of the factors at play in these various 
positions with regard to representation is a slippage between the procedural meaning of 
representation, as a form of governance, and its theatrical or mimetic meaning, as an image 
or semblance of the demos.  This tension can be seen in Dean and Jones’s argument: even as 
they defend the necessity of representation, they reproduce a kind of anti-theatrical 
prejudice in the way they qualify their account of these forms.  This occurs as they describe 
an abstraction or degradation of the political, which increases as the formal mechanisms of 
these movements become separated from their moment of dissensual rupture: ‘The more 
distant and dispersed an action is from that relation, the less representative it is’.69  Wary of 
the fetishizing of certain forms—such as the consensus procedure critiqued by Cornell above, 
or the overly procedural general assembly—they draw on Rousseau’s idea of a general will to 
develop the idea of an ‘active political willing’.  This active political willing can be understood 
to be expressed through various acts of representation; however, they also imply that it has 
some ontological priority and exists independently of them, such that forms of 
representation can find themselves further or closer to this fundamental political expression: 
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‘For all their much celebrated inclusivity, the movement’s General Assemblies, like 
parliamentary bodies more broadly, distance themselves from active political willing’.70  Such 
a description casts these representational forms as a necessary evil, useful for giving 
apprehensible form to some pre-existing wrong, but only ever standing in a mimetic 
relationship to that wrong, and only ever a shadow of ‘real’ democracy to which they might 
have greater or less proximity. 
But what if we were to think of the procedural and mimetic meanings of representation not 
in opposition, but as working together?  In such a view, the capacity for ‘active political 
willing’ would not need to be hypothesized as existing prior to the various forms that attempt 
to resemble it, but instead to be generated out of these forms themselves.  In a 2012 debate 
with Jacques Rancière, Ernesto Laclau asks whether the principle of representation is ‘a lesser 
evil added on to a democratic principle that would otherwise represent a homogenous 
popular will?’  Laclau offers his own view on this question, and, like Dean and Jones, he 
concerns himself with the formation of political will: 
I think that this would only be the case if popular will could be formed entirely 
outside of the mechanisms of representation. And that is where I would draw a 
line. I don’t believe that it is possible to form a democratic will, nor a popular will, 
except via the mechanisms of representation. […] In other words, I don’t see that 
there is a democratic principle opposed to the principle of representation, but 
instead a political construction process which cuts across the moment of the basic 
formation of the popular will and the moment of representation.71 
Here Laclau suggests that the generation of mechanisms of representation can be 
understood as a ‘political construction process’, and political will is not something prior to 
these structures that they conceal or reveal, but instead something generated in and through 
them.  Indeed, the problem of fetishizing consensus-based processes and other anti-
representational forms of organisation might emerge precisely as a result of the belief that 
one has escaped representational structures.  It is worth remembering that processes such as 
consensus-based decision-making emerged not out of a mistrust of representational 
structures, but a mistrust of structurelessness.  This was powerfully articulated by Jo Freeman 
in the context of second-wave feminism as ‘the tyranny of structurelessness’: wherever it is 
claimed there is an absence of structure, Freeman argued, it only means that the structures 
are hidden, usually preserving entrenched hierarchies based on gender, race, and economic 
privilege (which is exactly the point that Cornell makes in his critique).  Structurelessness 
does not exist, Freeman wrote: ‘We cannot decide whether to have a structured or 
structureless group, only whether or not to have a formally structured one.’72 
Formal consensus-based decision-making is one such form that emerged out of this context, 
and, despite its name, when closely followed it emphasises dissent as much as it is oriented 
toward consensus.  One handbook puts it this way: 
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While decision making is as much about conflict as it is about agreement, Formal 
Consensus works best in an atmosphere in which conflict is encouraged, 
supported, and resolved cooperatively with respect, nonviolence, and creativity. 
Conflict is desirable. It is not something to be avoided, dismissed, diminished, or 
denied.73 
We might therefore think of formal structures such as consensus-based decision-making as 
being representational structures designed to produce disagreement, even dissensus; by 
simultaneously encouraging conflict and equality, they might be understood as giving form to 
what Mouffe describes as ‘conflictual consensus’.74  Consensus-based decision-making is one 
form of the art of the ‘we’, and recent years have seen a proliferation of creative forms for 
the facilitation of group processes and actions, catalogued in collections such as steirischer 
herbst’s Truth Is Concrete,75 or in the ongoing crowd-sourced project Beautiful Trouble.76 
But this is not to mistake any of these structures for forms of direct democracy or a 
transcendence of representation.  As Mouffe clarifies elsewhere: 
Critical artistic practices […] do not aspire to lift a supposedly false consciousness 
as to reveal the ‘true reality’.  This would be completely at odds with the anti-
essentialist premises of the theory of hegemony, which rejects the very idea of a 
‘true consciousness’.77 
Rather than seeking to escape from representation, what these forms offer is a 
representational pluralism, each holding open a space in which the boundaries between what 
does and does not count as politics are not fixed, but negotiable.  Democracy might look like 
a parliamentary vote or a mass of demonstrators along a fixed line, but it also might look like 
an encampment, a carnivalesque picnic in a luxury food shop, a decision to stand still in a 
public square, or anarchists chanting around a burning fire.  It is these forms of signification, 
the care and labour put into engendering the conditions for action, and the embodied modes 
by which participants engage with them that give rise to the experience of active political 
willing, not the other way around.  That is to say: without representation, no politics.  This is 
what democracy looks like. 
 
 
1 Although obviously in the shadow of the 2001 terrorist attacks in New York, Washington DC, 
and Pennsylvania, the vigil also recalled an earlier September 11: the 1973 coup d’état in 
Chile, with which the US CIA was allegedly complicit, and after which Augusto Pinochet would 
rise to power.   
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